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• U.K. foodborne disease
– ~60 million people, 900,000 cases per year
– Several hundred deaths 
– Costs: about £1.5 billion (2004 prices)
Food Standards Agency: www.food.gov.uk
• Presentation Structure
– What is HAS?
– Review scores 
• By plant type and pre- post-HACCP
– What changed in 2006?
– Next stepsWhat is HAS?
• HAS = Hygiene Assessment System 
• Adopted in 1997
• Hygiene standards in all slaughterhouses and 
cutting plants monitored monthly by MHS (Meat 
Hygiene Service)
• Monthly HAS scores (0-100) published online
– Moving average of previous three months
• Paper uses plant-level monthly data 1998 to 2005Industry Structure
56.3% 824 Cutting plants
43.8% 641 Slaughterhouse Operation 
Type
52.4% 768 Other
13.3% 195 Poultry meat only
34.3% 502 Red meat only
Specie
41.4% 606 Small
58.6% 859 Large Plant Size
5.6% 82 Northern Island 
6.7% 98 Wales 
9.2% 135 Scotland 
78.5% 1,150 England 
Region
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HAS Scores by Operation TypeNonparametric Comparisons
1. Pre- and post-HACCP
2. Across four regions 
• England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland
3. Plant type 
• Large and small
• Red meat and poultry
• Slaughterhouses and cutting plantsWhat is HACCP?
• HACCP = Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point
• Internationally recognized and recommended 
system of food safety management
• Focuses on identifying the ‘critical points’ in a 
process where food safety problems (or 
‘hazards’) can arise 
• Puts controls in place to prevent things going 
wrong then monitors the process
• Record keeping is an important part of HACCPPre- and post-HACCP
• HACCP implementation by June 7, 2002 for 
large plants and June 7, 2003 for small plants
• Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
•F o r   large plants, no change in HAS scores pre-
and post-HACCP (90% confidence level)
•F o r   small plants, HAS scores went up after 
HACCP was implemented (99% confidence level)Regional Differences in HAS Scores
• Friedman’s distribution-free test for unordered 
alternatives - HAS scores differ by geographic 
region (99% confidence level)
• Multiple 2-way comparisons (4 regions, 6 pairs)
– Only Scotland > England (99% confidence level)
– No other ordering conclusions can be drawn
• Possible explanations: Scotland has different 
history of food safety violations; distinct red 
meat combinations; stronger export orientationDifferences in HAS Scores
Plant size
• Reject the null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level
• Can conclude θ > 0 
• Full throughput (large) premises have higher HAS scores than 
smaller (low throughput) premises
Specie
• Reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level
• Can conclude θ > 0
• Red meat premises have higher HAS scores than poultry premises
Operation type
• Reject the null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level
• Can conclude θ < 0
• Slaughterhouses have lower HAS scores than cutting plantsWhat Influences HAS Scores?
Regression Results
• Larger-sized plants and plants in Scotland 
have higher scores
• Plants in Wales are more likely to have 
lower scores 
• Operation type and specie don’t have 
significant impact on HAS score 
• HAS scores improved over time and 
following HACCP implementationAll Change!
• HAS concluded in December 2005
– EU-wide risk-based Audit system replaced HAS 
• Audit categories impacted by Food Business 
Operator-level (FBO) risk factors
– Related to the establishment activities and nature of 
the food business 
• Fixed scores - higher score may be consequence of 
establishment's higher risk activities not necessarily reflecting 
performance of FBO
– Related to the FBOs’ actions 
• Based on the FBOs’ actions and compliance historyAudits
At least once every 2 months V
At least once every 3 months IV
At least once every 5 months III
At least once every 8 months II
At least once every 12 months I
Minimum Audit Frequency Audit Category
• Slaughterhouse and cutting plant audits at least 
once every eight months (Category II)First Audit Report: 271 Plants
• Transition from continuous numerical to 
categorical risk communication
• Comparing audit categories within plant groupsFuture Research
• Case studies
– Why certain plants and regions perform better
• One Scottish plant scored 100 (1998 to 2004)
• Tracking the audit risk-based scheme
– Correlations between audit category and 
previous HAS scores for each plantFuture Research
• Link performance measures to plant 
characteristics in more comprehensive 
models
• Absolute vs. relative performance
• Who uses this risk communication?
– Point of purchase connection?Thanks!
• Hooker.27@osu.edu; http://aede.osu.edu
• Neal Hooker received a Ph.D. in Resource Economics from the University of Massachusetts then 
concurrently held postdoc positions at U. Mass and the Center for Food Safety at Texas A&M University. He 
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AAEA section cosponsors: FSN, AEM, FAMPS, INT
Industry perspectives on incentives for food safety innovation
Continuous food safety innovation as a management strategy
Dave Theno, Jack in the Box, US
Economic incentives for food safety in their supply chain
Susan Ajeska, Fresh Express, US
Innovative food safety training systems
Gary Fread, Guelph Food Technology Centre, Canada
Organizational and technological food safety innovations
Is co-regulation more efficient and effective in supplying safer food?
Marian Garcia, Dept. of Agricultural Sciences, Imperial College London
Andrew Fearne, Centre for Supply Chain Research, University of Kent, UK
Chain level dairy innovation and changes in expected recall costs
Annet Velthuis, Cyriel van Erve, Miranda Meuwissen, & Ruud Huirne
Business Economics & Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture, 
Wageningen University, the NetherlandsRegulatory food safety innovations
Prioritization of foodborne pathogens
Marie-Josée Mangen, J. Kemmeren, Y. van Duynhoven, A.H. and Havelaar,
National Institute for Public Health & Environment (RIVM), the Netherlands
Risk-based inspection: US Hazard Coefficients for meat and poultry 
Don Anderson, Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA
UK HAS scores and impact on economic incentives 
Wenjing Shang and Neal H. Hooker, Department of Agricultural, 
Environmental & Development Economics, Ohio State University
Private market mechanisms and food safety insurance
Sweden’s decade of success with private insurance for Salmonella in broilers
Tanya Roberts, ERS, USDA and Hans Andersson, SLU, Sweden
Are product recalls insurable in the Netherlands dairy supply chain?
Miranda Meuwissen, Natasha Valeeva, Annet Velthuis & Ruud Huirne, 
Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture; Business Economics & Animal 
Sciences Group, Wageningen University, the Netherlands
Recapturing value from food safety certification: incentives and firm strategy
Suzanne Thornsbury, Mollie Woods and Kellie Raper 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University
“New Food Safety Incentives & Regulatory, Technological  
& Organizational Innovations” - 7/22/2006, Long Beach, CA  (con’t)Applications evaluating innovation and incentives for food safety
Impact of new US food safety standards on produce exporters in northern 
Mexico
Belem Avendaño, Department of Economics, Universidad Autónoma de 
Baja California, Mexico and Linda Calvin, ERS, USDA
EU food safety standards and impact on Kenyan exports of green beans and fish
Julius Okello, University of Nairobi, Kenya
Danish Salmonella control: benefits, costs, and distributional impacts
Lill Andersen, Food and Resource Economics Institute, and Tove 
Christensen, Royal Danish Veterinary and Agricultural University, Denmark
Wrap up panel discussion of conference 
FSN section rep. – Tanya Roberts, ERS, USDA
AEM section rep. – Randy Westgren, University of Illinois
INT section rep. – Julie Caswell, University of Massachusetts
FAMPS section rep. – Jean Kinsey, University of Minnesota
Discussion of everyone attending conference
Note: speaker is either the 1st person named or the person underlined.
Thanks to RTI International for co-sponsoring the workshop.
“New Food Safety Incentives & Regulatory, Technological  
& Organizational Innovations” - 7/22/2006, Long Beach, CA  (con’t)Workshop objectives
- Analyze how new public policies and private strategies are changing economic incentives 
for food safety, 
- Showcase frontier research and the array of new analytical tools and methods that 
economists are applying to food safety research questions,  
- Evaluate the economic impact of new food safety public policies and private strategies on 
the national and international marketplace, 
- Demonstrate how new public polices and private strategies in one country can force 
technological change and influence markets and regulations in other countries, and
- Encourage cross-fertilization of ideas between the four sponsoring sections.
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